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Abstract
Modern corporations use complex debt instruments and pursue acquisitions. In order
to analyze the properties of some of these contracts in the event of an acquisition, this
paper considers a company that has an incumbent capital structure, comprising one of ve
practically important structured debt contracts. An opportunity for an acquisition comes
along that was not ex-ante contractible. The equityholder decides on the nancing of this
expansion by trading o tax advantages of debt against costs of bankruptcy. The model
yields a number of insights for structured debt and acquisitions, four of which are as follows:
First, a seniority clause oers the bondholder protection from agency, but it also decreases
the equityholder's incentives to nance the acquisition. Second, embedded call options are
valuable even if interest rates are constant, because they allow the equityholder to issue a
new bond at fair value. Third, bankruptcy remoteness is valuable, if assets are very risky.
Fourth, convertible bonds are vulnerable to agency and the conversion option bears the
same incentive problem as a seniority clause. These properties explains, for example, the
otherwise puzzling practice of companies buying out convertible bond holders prior to an
acquisition.
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1 Introduction
Earlier literature about capital structure and investments, Modigliani and Miller (1958) for the
nancing side or McDonald and Siegel (1986) for the investment side, suggested that the invest-
ment decision may be disconnected from the nancing decision as the Fisher Separation Theorem
suggests. However, a number of papers like Gomes and Schmid (2010) have pointed out that
in the presence of frictions, the investment decision and the nancing decision of an individual
rm, have to be evaluated jointly. It is already mentioned in the original Modigliani and Miller
(1958) paper that: These [ ... ] drastic simplications have been necessary in order to come to
grips with the problem. Having served their purpose they can now be relaxed in the direction of
greater realism and relevance, a take which we hope others interested in this area will wish to
share.
In an insightful paper Leland (1998) laid the foundations for what is since known, as the struc-
tural model for capital structure. He analyzed the agency conict between bondholders and
equityholder over the operational as well as over the nancial risk policy of a corporation. An
interesting stream of literature on debt agency has evolved over time, analyzing nancing and
investment decisions jointly, usually under a capital structure that contains straight debt and eq-
uity. Mauer and Sarkar (2005) extended the theory toward nancing real options and elaborated
on the conict of interests between the same pair of agents. Sundaresan and Wang (2008) on
a theoretical level and Hennessy and Whited (2005) on an empirical level, added some insights
about leverage ratios, implying lower leverage ratios for non-mature companies.
Most of the literature on nancing real options address the question of the optimal capital struc-
ture and the value added or lost due to an acquisition only for the most basic form of debt -
a straight bond. This stands in conict with the large industry and volume of structured debt
contracts. This market experienced a set back due to the late 2000s nancial crisis. But in Q2
2010 emission volumes of structured debt contracts are - a least according to press reports - re-
covering.1 A small number of papers have analyzed dierent forms of debt contracts, but mostly
with respect to other issues than acquisitions and debt agency. Childs et al. (2005) showed that
nancial exibility achieved by shorter debt maturity has an overwhelmingly positive eect on
the agency conict between the equityholder and the bondholder. In Leland (1998), the same
thing was found to be inecient. Hackbarth et al. (2008) analyze the consequences of using
bank debt as opposed to public debt on leverage ratios and the choice of seniority. Martellini
1See e.g. "Bank of America Said to Market 300 Million CLO for Tetragon", by Pierre Paulden, Bloomberg,
Jul 19, 2010 or in general on the subject "Bringing back CLOs", by Vipal Monga, The Deal Magazine, November
27, 2009.
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and Milhau (2009) look at the choice of xed vs. oating rate debt, but within an asset and
liability management perspective. Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2008) consider convertible and
callable bonds within a Leland (1998)-model. This is however a model of risk switching instead
of investmenting and there are no unexpected actions.
In a second insightful paper, Leland (2007) analyzes the nancial synergies that asset securiti-
zation may provide. He starts with the observation, that issuer of asset backed securities use
rather abstract terms when explaining the value added of securitization, such as the claim that it
unlocks hidden asset value. The paper analyzes how nancial benets of a merger depend upon
asset volatility as well as on the correlation between incumbent assets and new assets. In that
paper however, there are no diverging interests between the bondholders and the equityholder
and thus no room for agency conicts.
In the present paper, I analyze the value added, potential agency gains/losses and potential
welfare loss associated with ve distinct structured debt contracts in the event of an unexpected
corporate acquisition. In a two-period trade o model of capital structure, this paper sets to
answer the following questions:
1. How do bondholders and equityholders gain or loose on grounds of an unexpected acquisi-
tion given an incumbent structured debt contract? Who is it that incurs losses or realizes
gains?
2. How is the direction as well as the order of magnitude of these value shift inuenced by
risk, bankruptcy costs and taxes?
3. What part of these gains or losses are associated to agency?
4. How relevant is a potential welfare loss caused by agency?
5. What kind of elements of nancial structuring protect from agency costs, what elements
favor agency costs?
6. What is a good debt contract if unexpected acquisitions are potentially an issue.
The setup in this paper in some sense includes an incomplete contract on restructuring, since
it is assumed that further capital structure adjustments are not contractible ex ante. Any kind
of gains/losses associated with agency in this paper are the result of limited contractibility. The
two period model I consider, is an extension of the model in Leland (2007). There exists one
company that has an incumbent capital structure and incumbent assets. These assets are nor-
mally distributed. A merger or an acquisition becomes available to the company, that requires
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fresh capital if it is pursued. This comes as a surprise for all stakeholders, which is dierent to
sequential nancing, where the future investment needs are known ex ante. So it is a situation
of imperfect rather than asymmetric information, what makes the situation a problem of incom-
plete contracting. All the bargaining power in this paper is assumed to be in the hands of the
equityholders.
The incumbent capital structure in the setup in this paper contains equity and a debt contract,
which can be
 I) an unsecured straight bond without priority
 II) a senior secured straight bond
 III) a callable bond
 IV) a single asset and single tranche collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
 V) a convertible bond
A word on the meaning of the term structured nance at this point. There are commonly two
meanings associated with this term. First, structured nance in a narrow sense means the kind
of contracts that boomed prior to the late 2000s nancial crisis, which were termed collateralized
loan obligation (CLO). One of the main feature of that kind of debt contract is that it is secured
with specic asset(s) which are transferred to a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity. So in
its narrow meaning, structured nance is equivalent to asset securitization or project nancing.
In the narrow sense of the word only contract (IV) - which is a single asset and single tranche
CLO - is a structured debt contract. This is the way the term is used in Leland (2007). Second,
in a broader sense the term structured nance means all kind of debt contracts that have more
complex contractual clauses than a simple straight bond. This is how the word is used in Vanden
(2009) or in Jobst (2007). That is also the way the term structured is used in connection with
structured products that are sold to investors in wealth management. Therefore in its broad
meaning contracts (II) - (V) are structured debt contracts. I will use the term in its broad
meaning and consider its narrow meaning as a specic form of structured nance, namely asset
securitization.
The capital for the acquisition is raised by an optimal package of equity and straight debt only.
This has two reasons: First, the conict of interests arises between the incumbent bondholder
and the equityholder, so the incumbent debt contract is the object of interest not the new debt
contract. The new bondholders receive a fairly priced bond independent of what kind of debt
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contract they buy, anything else would be arbitrage. Second, it limits the number of situations
considerably. The decision of the capital structure is taken either to maximize the company's
total value or to maximize the value of the company's equity stake. The objective function is
a trade o, optimizing between the tax advantage of debt and the costs of bankruptcy, as rst
formalized by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). Value added is the value added or lost that the
incumbent bondholders and the equityholder realize from the acquisition. Agency costs/gains
are a subset of value added, that is realized as a direct consequence of implementing an equity
maximizing rather than a value maximizing capital structure i.e. agency costs are a transfer in
value from the bondholder to the equityholder. There may also be a welfare loss or deadweight
loss, which is the loss in overall value on implementing an equity maximizing capital structure
rather than a value maximizing capital structure. Similar to Leland (2007), it is assumed that
assets are additive i.e. that there are no operational synergies associated with acquisitions. A
value increase/loss of one stakeholder is therefore either an overall value added provided by the
acquisition or a transfer of value from one stakeholder to the other.
There are four issues that drive value added: the volatility of the acquired assets, the tax shield,
the bankruptcy costs and limited liability. An acquisition may increase or decrease the former
three, depending on the specics of the incumbent debt contract, the incumbent assets and the
new assets. The eect of limited liability is always value decreasing as it has been noted by Sarig
(1985) and others.
There are two distinct forms of agency occurring in this model: Through controlling the acqui-
sition the equityholder may inuence the overall volatility of the company's assets. From the
bondholders perspective the equityholder may engage in what was termed asset substitution in
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This term means a transfer of value from the incumbent bond-
holder's claim to the equityholder's claim through a worsening of the quality of the company's
assets. This also works indirectly: The equityholder may take on excess leverage that is pari
passu to the incumbent bond in order to dilute the incumbent claim. This is termed debt dilu-
tion.2
The second agency problem is an underinvestment problem of the equityholder. Originally, it
was termed debt overhang by Myers (1977). It is the problem that some of the additional capital
that the equityholder invests or more precisely some of the prots that this additional capital
yields, is ex post claimed by the bondholders. The bondholder free rides on the equityholder's
additional capital outlay.
2See e.g. Schwartz (1989).
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Question 2 at the beginning refers to three parameters of interest, risk, bankruptcy costs and
the tax rate. I will oer on each of the three parameters a perspective to analyze the eects of
an unexpected acquisition on the structured debt contracts. With the term perspective I refer to
an appropriate two dimensional grid over which a mesh of e.g. added value for the equityholder
is drawn. A perspective is therefore a three-dimensional representation of value added, agency
costs, etc. This allows to see how the value of the contracts evolves over an extensive set of
values for the key parameters risk, bankruptcy costs and the tax rate. Whenever possible, the
numerical ndings are armed with anecdotal evidence from the nancial market.
By analyzing these three perspectives, it is shown that unsecured straight debt is vulnerable to
agency - more precisely claim dilution - unless risk is low and the tax rate is high. In terms of
bankruptcy costs, agency costs are the worst when bankruptcy costs are at an average level.
A seniority clause helps to protect the bondholder from this form of agency, but it gives raise
to the other agency problem that is similar to debt overhang. As a consequence of the seniority
clause, the bondholder prots form the equityholder's investment without contributing to it. The
equityholder's value added from an acquisition is then reduced or even negative.
An embedded call option can help to overcome this latter agency problem, since it allows the
equityholder to renance an incumbent bond. The incumbent bond, whose value potentially
increases after the acquisition, may then be replaced with one whose price is exactly at fair value
after the acquisition.
Securitization oers another way to overcome the second agency problem but with a dierent
tool, namely bankruptcy remoteness. The assets are kept separately from each other such that
there is no issue with debt overhang. Moreover, bankruptcy remoteness can reduce nancing
costs if the acquisition is very risky, because if one asset is in distress it cannot infect the other.
The equityholder can, similar to Leland (2007), further prot from additional limited liability
that is provided by the additional entity.
A convertible bond - often praised as sweetened debt - is problematic: In Green (1984) it was
argued that convertible bonds are a solution for asset substitution. However, similar as in Hen-
nessy and Tserlukevich (2008), the agency problem that occurs and the equityholder's incentives
depend on whether the bond part or the option part of the convertible bond dominates. When
it is the bond part that dominates, the convertible bond is - similar to an unsecured bond -
vulnerable to claim dilution. When it is the conversion option that dominates, the equityholder
has a constant debt overhang problem, similar to a seniority clause. This is because the con-
version option allows the bondholder to prot form the equityholder's additional capital outlay
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to nance the acquisition - without contributing to it. A conversion option potentially prevents
asset substitution as proposed by Green (1984), but it exchanges it with a debt overhang prob-
lem. For that reason, a convertible bond ought to be issued callable and should be called prior
to acquisitions. Vanden (2009) proposes an altered payo structure for a convertible bond that
adjusts itself to the value of the assets. However, that payo structure bears large bankruptcy
costs and it is at least questionable whether it would be qualied as debt for tax and bankruptcy
purposes.
The conclusion is that - within the scope of this model - a callable bond with a seniority clause
is the optimal choice for a company that potentially has to deal with unexpected acquisitions. It
oers protection against both forms of agency and allows to redeem the bond when an acquisition
is carried out. Securitization is the optimal choice if the risk of the acquisition is very high. Then
bankruptcy remoteness becomes valuable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
delivers the results and predictions of the model and relates it to anecdotal evidence. Section 4
oers recommendation for debt structuring. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model I present in the paper to analyze debt structuring and acquisitions is a two period trade
o model of capital structure. It is essentially an extension of the model in Leland (2007). What
makes the model in this paper dierent from the model in Leland (2007) is that i) structured
debt contracts are analyze and ii) more than one debt contract may be on the company's books.
Without the later one does not have an agency conict, which is the case in Leland (2007) and
which is what is intended by the respective paper, since the questions addressed in that paper are
dierent form the questions addressed in the present paper. In this part, the model is introduced.
A. The basic model - A corporation with one asset and one straight
bond on it's books
I) Corporate tax law and corporation law
Two common characteristics of corporate tax law and corporation law are part of this model: i)
A corporation's operational activities are subject to corporate taxation, the tax rate is denoted
by  , ii) interest payments on corporate debt are tax deductible and iii) a corporation enjoys
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limited liability.3 A corporation in this model is therefore similar to the payo of a call option
written on the company's assets with strike price zero. As already mention in Leland (2007),
there is a cross dependency here: The value of the debt inuences the interest expenditures, the
interest expenditures inuence the value of the tax shield and the tax shield inuences company's
asset value. But the company's asset value in turn inuence the value of the debt.
II) Assets and environment
The model is a two period model, so there are only two points in time relevant to the model,
namely t = 0 and t = T , where T is some point in the future. An asset in this model is denoted
by Xti , where i denotes the index and t the time. Assets are a future cash ows generated at
t = T by some business activity. Assets are assumed to be normally distributed, with some mean
i 2 (0;1) and some standard deviation i 2 (0;1) i.e. an asset is fully dened by the pair
(i; i).
4 If a company owns two assets, these two assets have some correlation i;j 2 [ 1; 1].
There are no operational synergies in this model i.e. payos are additive. There exists a risk free
asset or a risk free interest rate rf . Also, universal risk-neutrality is assumed. This immediately
implies that at t = 0, asset i's value needs to be equal to
X0i = E
"
XTi 
1 + rf
T
#
i.e. the discounted expected value.
III) A straight bond in this model
A straight bond in this model is a nancial security, that promises to pay an amount or principal
P at maturity. At t = 0 the corporation issues such a security at fair market value D(P ). The
dierence between P and D(P ) is the interest paid on this debt contract. Since interest payments
are tax deductible, the company is - given it has a straight bond on it's books - only subject to
taxation if the company's earnings are higher than it's interest expenses i.e. if
XTi > XZT = P  D(P ) (1)
3Especially the second feature of corporation law is - according to Kraakman et al. (2009) - a fundamental
principle of corporation law. As such it is found in next to every developed jurisdiction.
4Financial assets are commonly assumed to have a support greater than zero. However, real assets may have
a value less then zero. One may think of an activity that causes huge claims for compensation for damage.
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where XZT denotes a zero tax boundary.
A company les for bankruptcy if the value of it's assets at t = T are below P . Since it is a two
period model, a default leads to a liquidation in the spirit of Chapter 75 or Title 6 of the Swiss
Bankruptcy Code6. Together with the deductibility of interest paid on the bond, this implies
that the default boundary Xd in this model satises
Xd = P +  max(X
T
i  XZT ; 0)
One needs to have Xd  XZT , otherwise the interest payment would exceed the nal xed
payment which is a contradiction.7 A company therefore defaults in this model if
XTi < Xd = P +

1   D(P ) (2)
Default is assumed to be costly, if a company defaults some fraction  of asset value is lost.
Given corporate taxation and costly default, an optimal capital structure can be derived that is
the solution to the trade o rst formalized in the Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), where the tax
shield is traded o against bankruptcy costs.
The question arises, how interest payments have to be treated, when a company is in default. In
Leland (2007) it is assumed that the company - and thus it's bondholders - retain full interest
deduction in default. Kim (1978) argues, based on a legal assessment, that creditors of a bankrupt
corporation will most likely loose the tax shield. I will follow Kim (1978) and assume that
bankrupt corporation loose their tax shield.8
Given the real and legal environment in this model, the fair market value D(P ) of a straight
bond with principal P on the books of company with one asset is
D(P ) =
1
(1 + rf )

P

1  

Xd   i
i

+ (1    )G(0; Xd; i; i)

(3)
and the market value of the equity E is
511 United States Code (2010), Chapter 7.
6Bundesgesetzt uber Schuldbetreibung- und Konkurs (SchKG), SR 281.1.
7This is shown in Leland (2007), page 771.
8Under Swiss Law, namely under x149(4) of the Swiss Bankruptcy Code, post petition interest is not tax
deductible. Under the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 United States Code (2010)) it is less clear: The
wording of x502(b)(2) of the United States Bankruptcy Code implies the same regime as under Swiss law. The
case law on this matter is opaque. As note in Potter (2002), there seems to be a conict between state level courts
and the Circuit Courts. In the case of In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp. (77-1 U.S.T.C., 9121 (E.D.N.Y.
1976)) as well as in Kellogg v. United States (In re West Texas Marketing Corp., 54 F.3d 1194.) the second and
the fth circuit court have denied deduction of post petition interest to bankrupt corporations. In the case In re
Dow Corning Corp. (270 B.R. 393.) the Eastern District of Michigan Bankruptcy Court has granted deduction
of post petition interest.
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E(P ) =
1
(1 + rf )T

G(Xd;1; i; i)  P

1  

Xd   i
i

 

(1 + rf )T

G(Xd; XZT ; i; i) XZT

1  

Xd   i
i

(4)
where
(x) =
1p
2
exp

 1
2
x2

; (x) =
1p
2
Z x
 1
exp

 1
2
y2

dy =
1
2

1 + erf

xp
2

G(xd; xu; ; ) =
Z xu
xd
x


x  


dx = 


xu   


  
xd   


+


xd   


  
xu   


IV) Optimal capital structure
The optimal capital structure is determined by selecting the optimal principal P . Since there is
in case with only one bond in place no room for agency problems, an equity maximizing strategy
is equivalent to an value maximizing strategy. The optimal principal is determined by solving
the problem
P  = argmax
P
fD(P ) + E(P )g (5)
Since the legal setup for the company's tax treatment creates the mention cross dependencies
and the equations determining D and E contain special functions, it is not possible to solve the
above problem explicitly. One has to rely on numerical techniques in order to obtain P .
B. Acquisitions and structured debt contracts in this model
I) Acquisitions and their implementation
In this section I introduce acquisitions and structured debt contracts. At t = 0 it is assumed that
the company has already an asset 1 dened by the pair (1; 1) on it's asset side of the balance
sheet. On the liability side it has a debt contract with principal P 1 and equity. It's capital
structure is optimally selected according to the objective function in equation 5.
At t = 0, an acquisition becomes available - i.e. the company may invest in a second asset,
which is dened by the pair (2; 2) and correlation 1;2. The new investment opportunity set is
therefore dened by the ve parameters (1; 1; 2; 2; 1;2). Assets are traded at their unlevered
after tax value. The company may nance the acquisition by a mix of straight debt and equity
i.e. the company may issue a second bond with principal P2. The optimal principal P2 of the
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new bond depends on the incumbent contract as well as on the objective function which may
either be value maximizing or equity maximizing.
II) Debt contracts in the extended model
In the following I introduce the debt contracts listed in the introduction. I will dene the
contracts and give pricing formulas for the market value of the structured debt contracts after
the acquisition, the new straight debt contract and the equity. These equations are the ex-
tended versions of equations 3 and 4. It was assumed that assets are additive and normally
distributed. As a consequence of this, for contracts which do not require that the company
places the assets in bankruptcy remote entities, the asset side of the company may be treated as
one synthetic asset 3, which is described by the parameter pair (3; 3), where 3 = 1 + 2 and
3 =
q
21 + 
2
2 + 2121;2.
i) Unsecured straight bond
In this model, an unsecured straight bond is a bond with principal P1, which is not specically
secured with the asset side of the company. This means that the bondholder's claim has no
priority over other debt claims when the liquidation proceeds are distributed. This is the rst of
the so called priority principles of Schwartz (1989) that the current United States Bankruptcy
Code as well as the Swiss Bankruptcy Code follow. This principle essentially means that the
incumbent bond and the new bond are pari passu when liquidation proceeds are distributed.
The zero tax barrier is at
XZT = P

1  D1(P2) + P2  D2(P2) (6)
and the default barrier at
Xd = P

1 + P2 +

1   (D1(P2) +D2(P2)) (7)
Then the market value of the incumbent and the new debt contracts are
D1(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P 1 1  Xd   33

+
P 1 (1    )
P 1 + P2
G(0; Xd; 3; 3)

(8)
and
D2(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P2 1  Xd   3
3

+
P2(1    )
P 1 + P2
G(0; Xd; 3; 3)

(9)
11
The rst term is just the repayment of the principal in case the company does not default.
In default, which is the second term, the bondholders are pari passu, i.e. from the liquidation
proceeds they both receive a share that is proportional to the ratio of their own principal over
total outstanding liabilities. The market value of the equity is then
E(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 (1  )G(Xd;1; 3; 3)  (P1 + P2  XZT )1  Xd   33

(10)
The equation for the equity has only a non-default term. It receives all proceeds form the
assets minus the debt payments plus the tax shield if the company is solvent.
ii) Senior secured straight bond
In this model, a senior secured bond is a bond with principal P1 that is secured with the company's
assets. It has priority over a potential new bond issued by the company, meaning when liquidation
proceeds are distributed, this bond is served rst. This is the third principle of the priority
principles in Schwartz (1989). The new junior bond only receives liquidation proceeds if the
senior bond is fully served. As a consequence of that clause, one needs an additional barrier that
indicates - given the company has defaulted - at what level the senior bond is fully served and
thus the junior bond receives liquidation proceeds. One may view this as a synthetic default
barrier for the incumbent senior bond, since every state above this barrier yields a payo for
that bond that is equivalent to a state above the default barrier. This barrier XSD is at
9
XSD =
P 1
1     
The distribution of liquidation proceeds is the only dierence between i) and ii). This implies
that the equations for the default barrier, the zero tax barrier and the fair market value of the
equity remain the same i.e. equations 6, 7 and 10 remain valid for this contract. The fair market
value of the incumbent senior bond after the acquisition is
D1(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P 1 1  XSD   33

+ (1    )G(0; XSD; 3; 3)

(11)
9For more convenient pricing equation, one would like to have the following ordering between the new synthetic
default barrier and the real default barrier: XSD  Xd. Given the form of the default barrier, this is satised by
the condition 
1   P

1  P2 + 1  (D1 +D2) - which essentially means, that  should not be too large. If 
would be very large then the gap between the company as a going concern and the company in liquidation could
be large enough that there exists a state where the company as a going concern has enough proceeds from the
assets to pay o both bonds, but in liquidation not enough to serve the senior bond. From here on forward I will
assume, that  is small enough that such a state does not exists.
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which looks like a conventional bond whose default barrier is at the synthetic default barrier.
The fair market value of the new junior bond is
D2(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P2 1  Xd   3
3

+ (1    )G(XSD; Xd; 3; 3)

 
1 
1 + rf
 P 1 Xd   33

  

XSD   3
3

(12)
The rst term is the value given the company does not default and the second and third term
are leftovers from the liquidation proceeds that the junior bond receives in default.
iii) Callable bond
A callable bond in this model is an incumbent bond with principal P1, that the company may
call at time t = 0 at pre-acquisition fair market value10. The callable bond allows the company
to have, a restart or reset of it's capital structure i.e. it may call the bond prior to the acquisition
and renance it together with the acquisition bond. What kind of impact that has on the value
of the equity, I will discuss in the next section. As far as the pricing equations are concerned, it
is essentially the same as in the base case, only that the asset side of the balance sheet is now
larger and contains the synthetic asset 3, so equations 3 and 4 govern the fair market values for
the scenario where a callable bond has been redeemed.
iv) CLO
A CLO is a bond with principal P1 that is secured with a specic asset of the issuing company.
To protect this asset from a potential default of the issuer on a combined level, the company
places the asset in a bankruptcy remote entity or simply in a subsidiary11. The company then
levers the asset through this subsidiary. The result is a debt contract that is backed by a specic
bankruptcy remote asset. After the acquisition there are two CLOs, one backed with asset 1, the
other backed with asset 2. As a consequence of that, the fair market value of the debt contracts
after the acquisitions as well as of the equity stakes may be valued with equations 3 and 4.
v) Convertible bond
A convertible bond is a bond that combines an unsecured straight bond with an option on
10Usually, calling a bond involves paying a penalty fee, but within the scope of this model, such a penalty fee
would be arbitrage.
11Strictly spoken, just placing assets in a subsidiary does not make them a priori bankruptcy remote. Paragraphs
35  45 of FAS 140 detail the conditions that have to be (jointly) fullled by a subsidiary to qualify for the status
of a qualifying special purpose entity. This status is necessary to issue CLOs. The nature of the technicalities in
FAS 140 are important but beyond the scope of this paper. It will just be assumed that they are fullled.
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some of the company's equity. In this model, it is a bond with principal P1 and the option to
convert it into a fraction  of the company's equity. If  - the conversion ratio - is equal to zero,
the conversion feature is void and the bond is equivalent to an unsecured straight bond. The
convertible bond is - as a result of the conversion privilege - assumed to be junior to a potential
new bond i.e. it contains a subordination clause. The conversion option is assumed to be dilution
protected. Also - given the conversion option is exercised - the hypothetical tax shield provided
by the convertible bond before it is converted is lost.
Sofar, all the dierent debt contract had the same pricing equations prior to the acquisition, when
the company has only one asset and one incumbent bond on its books. They were presented
in equations 3 and 4. Because of the conversion option, the convertible bond does not share
these equations. The default bound and the zero tax bound as per equations 1 and 2 remain the
same. The bondholder naturally exercises the conversion option optimally i.e. one has to dene
a conversion bound. This bound is at the point, where the value of the company's assets is high
enough to make the hypothetical equity stake of the bondholder worth more than the principal
received when the bond matures12
XCV =
P1
(1  )
The fair market value of a convertible bond prior to the acquisition is then
D(P1) =
1
(1 + rf )T
((1  )G(Xcv;1; 1; 1))+
1
(1 + rf )T

P1



XCV   1
1

  

Xd   1
1

+ (1  )G(0;Xd; 1; 1)

(13)
where the rst term is the value if the bond is converted, the second term the value when the
bond is not converted and the third term the value when the company defaults. The fair market
value of the equity stake is
E(P1) =
1
(1 + rf )T
((1  )(1  )G(Xcv;1; 1; 1))+
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(Xd; Xcv; 1; 1) + (Xz   P1)



XCV   1
1

 

Xd   1
1

(14)
12A problem of ordering similar to the one in footnote 9 arises here: One of course wants an orderingXd < XCV .
For that purpose the condition P1
Xd
>  should be satised i.e. the conversion ration should not be to high. From
here on forward I will assume that this is the case.
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That is the situation prior to the acquisition. Again the company nances the unexpected
acquisition with a mix of debt and equity. As already mention, it is assumed that the bond part of
the incumbent convertible bond is junior to the acquisition bond. The principal of the incumbent
convertible bond is optimally determined given the pre acquisition assets of the company using
equation 5. P2 denotes again the principal of the acquisition bond.
As a consequence of the combination of an incumbent convertible bond and a new bond, a
number of bounds are needed. These are presented in the list below
 A conversion bound XCV = P

1 +P2 (P2 D2(P2))
(1 )
 A zero tax bound when the conversion option has been exercised XZT2 = P2  D2(P2)
 A zero tax bound when the conversion option has not been exercised XZT1 = P 1  D1(P2)+
P2  D2(P2)
 A default bound Xd = P 1 + P2 + 1+ (D1(P2) +D2(P2))
 A synthetic default bound for the acquisition bond13 XSD = P21  
The fair market value of the incumbent convertible bond is then
D1(P2) =
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(XCV ;1; 3; 3)  P2

1  

XCV   3
3

+
1
(1 + rf )T

XZT2

1  

XCV   3
3

+ P 1



XCV   3
3

  

Xd   3
3

1
(1 + rf )T

(1    )G(XSD; Xd; 3; 3)  P2



Xd   3
3

  

XSD   3
3

(15)
The rst three terms reect the situation when bond is converted, the fourth term the situa-
tion when the bond is not converted and the fth and sixth term the situation when the company
defaults. The fair market value of the new bond is
D2(P2) =
1
(1 + rf )T

P2

1  

XSD   3
3

+ (1    )G(0; Xst; 3; 3)

(16)
13This bound is necessary because it is assumed that the new bond is senior to the convertible bond.
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The fair market value of the equity stake after the acquisition is
E(P2) =
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )

(1  )G(XCV ;1; 3; 3)  (P1   XZT2)

1  

XCV   3
3

+
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(Xd;XCV ; 3; 3) 
 
P 1 + P2   XZT1



XCV   3
3

  

Xd   3
3

(17)
III) The optimal nancing of the acquisition
The capital structure to implement the acquisition may either maximize the company's total
value or only maximize the company's equity value. Prior to the acquisition with only one bond,
these two strategies are equivalent - anything else would be arbitrage. With an acquisition after
the incumbent bond has been issued, these two strategies are not necessarily equivalent. The
reasons for that is that the acquisition allows the equityholder to alter the capital structure
subsequentially to his advantage. I will address this in more detail in section 3. Equation 18
- which is the two bond equivalent to equation 5 - states the problem to obtain the optimal
principal P 2 for a value maximizing post acquisition capital structure.
P 2 = argmax
P2
fD1(P2) +D2(P2) + E(P2)g (18)
The objective function for the equity maximizing capital structure is to maximize the equity's
net advantage of the acquisition i.e. the equityholder's value added minus the equityholder's
capital outlay to the nancing of the acquisition which is denoted by e(P2). The capital outlay
is the fraction of the costs14 of the acquisition K = (1 )
(1 rf )T
R1
0 X2dFX2 , that the equityholder
bears i.e. e(P2) = K  D2(P2). The equityholder's trade o is then
P 2 = argmax
P2
fE(P2)  e(P2)g = argmax
P2
fE(P2)  (K  D2(P2))g (19)
3 Implications and Results
This section presents the implications and results obtained from the model described in the last
section. These implications and insights help to answer the questions posed in the introduction.
14Remember that assets are assumed to be traded at its unlevered after tax value.
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They are also compared to anecdotal evidence to provide a link to what happens on the nancial
market.
To visualize this more clearly, I introduce some measurements of gains and losses that the equi-
tyholder of the bondholder may achieve or suer as a result of the acquisition. The debt value
added/loss (DVA), is the gain or loss in value that the incumbent bondholder achieves or suers
as a result of the acquisition. The equity value added/loss (EVA) is the net15 gain or loss in
value that the equityholder makes or suers as a result of the acquisition. The debt agency
costs (DAC) are the dierence between the debt value added/loss after the acquisition under a
value maximizing capital structure and the debt value added/loss after the acquisition under an
equity maximizing capital structure. The equity agency gains (EAG) is the dierence between
the equity value added/loss under a value maximizing capital structure after the acquisition and
the equity value added/loss under an equity maximizing capital structure after acquisition. The
welfare loss (WL) is the dierence between the over all value created/lost by the acquisition after
an equity maximizing capital structure is implemented versus a case where a value maximizing
capital structure is implemented.
As I mentioned earlier, there are only numerical solutions to the model, there is no closed form
solution. It is therefore necessary to assign values to the parameters. Table 1 presents the pa-
rameters that will have the same value throughout the paper. The assets in this model have
all the same expected present value and are traded in bits having a value of 100. The annual
volatility of the incumbent asset 1 is xed as well. The value assigned to this parameter is set
according to the empirical analysis of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) to the average annual asset
volatility of a BBB rated company. The conversion ratio of the convertible bond is also xed.
As mentioned in footnote 12, the conversion ration should not be to high. But it should also not
be too low because if ! 0, the conversion option is void and the convertible bond degenerates
an unsecured junior bond. The value in table 1 is a good trade o between the two issues.
Table 2 presents values for parameter that are xed unless they are the object of interest. The
correlation is a value that is not extreme in one direction or the other direction. The bankruptcy
costs are chosen according to the Leland (2007) paper. In that paper the value is selected to meet
observed recovery rates. In other papers analysing capital structure issues numerically, similar
values are used e.g. in Leland (1998) or a bit lower in Hennessy and Whited (2007). The tax
rate is an average value for both, the United States and Switzerland. The same value is used
in Leland (1998) and Leland (2007). Time to maturity is set to an average as well, in Leland
15Net gains or losses for the equityholder means gains/losses after accounting for the fresh capital that had to
be injected.
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(2007) it is mentioned that this is close to the estimated average corporate bond maturity. For
that maturity a comprehensive range of iTraxx and CDX indices exists and they are relatively
liquid.
A. The risk perspective
I) Unsecured straight bond
The functions of interest in this analysis are the functions that express a shift in one of the
stakeholder's value, agency cost or welfare loss. With the earlier mentioned term perspective I
refer to a mesh, drawn over an appropriate two dimensional grid. For instance gure 1 presents
the risk perspective of the DVA under a value maximizing capital structure i.e. the DVA drawn
over a grid of the annual volatility of the acquired assets (2) and the correlation between the
incumbent and the acquired assets (). I oer a perspective on risk, bankruptcy costs, taxes. For
the risk perspective of the unsecured straight bond, the results are collected in gure 1, using
the model introduced in the last section.
Figure 1(a) and gure 1(b) present the DVA under a value and an equity maximizing post-
acquisition capital structure. The north corner of the 2=-plane is the point with lowest risk
i.e. low volatility and no correlation, the south corner is the point with the most risk i.e. high
volatility and almost perfect correlation. What is observed is the following: An increase in the
company's asset volatility leads to a loss for the bondholders - having a concave claim - and to
a gain for the equityholder - having a convex claim. This holds true under a value maximizing
capital structure as well as under an equity maximizing capital structure. The models implies
here classical asset substitution. The reverse holds true for the EVA presented in gure 1(c) and
gure 1(d). Since the equityholder's claim is convex, the result is that the riskier the acquisition
is, the more the equityholder gains.
What is also visible for both - the DVA and the EVA - the losses and gains respectively are more
pronounced for the equity maximizing leverage choice. That can be seen more detailed in gures
1(e) and 1(f). DAC and EAG are both dierent from zero and the agency gains/loss increase
with risk. The equityholder may extract agency gains from the bondholder, not only through
asset substitution but also through a dilution of the bondholder's claim. He may do that by
using the change in the company's capital structure triggered by the acquisition to accumulate
excess leverage. This is presented in the special gure 1(h), which illustrates the dierence in
post acquisition leverage ratio of a value maximizing and an equity maximizing capital structure.
The dierence is positive and increasing with risk. It is classical debt dilution that the model is
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implying here.
The agency gains are more pronounced the riskier the acquisition is, because then debt dilution
may be reinforced with asset substitution. The order of magnitude of the dilution is between 2%
and 4%. This is a bit more that what was implied by Leland (1998) for an unsecured straight
bond. The question is, if that is a gure to worry about. In the much publicised Marriot Case
of 1993, the incumbent bondholders lost - according to Parrino (1997) - about 4% of their value.
As a consequence of the incumbent bondholder's pressure, the spin o plan was revised to reduce
their loss. So the model seems to imply an order of magnitude that is relevant to investors, but
still reasonable enough to nd anecdotal evidence.
Another example to demonstrate how this problem of debt dilution is observed in practice: In
2001 the US company Martin Marietta Materials took over the fellow US company Meridian
Aggregates. Martin Marietta was more focused on chemical building materials, while Meridian
was an aggregates and cement company. So there is certainly some correlation between the
two business, since both company's belong to the sector of building materials. This acquisition
lead to an increase in asset volatility as well as to an increase in leverage which eventually lead
to a decrease in interest coverage. As a result of that this led to a weaken [of the] existing
bondholder protection measures [namely the interest rate coverage] 16 and to a downgrade of
Martin Marietta's commercial paper program by Fitch. This is exactly what is implied by the
model in this paper.
The welfare loss is very low as an absolute gure, but it is also increasing with the riskiness of the
acquisition. This is because of the bondholder's convex claim, the claim is the more diluted, the
risker the acquisition is and asset substitution by denition implies that the company's business
risk is increased. The agency costs and thus the welfare loss is the worst, the more risky the
acquisition is.
II) Senior secured bond
The senior secured bond is a bond, where the bondholder's claim is senior to any potential new
bondholder. What happened above with the unsecured straight bond was that it was diluted
either by taking on more debt that was ranked pari passu (debt dilution) or by increasing the
risk of the company's assets (asset substitution) or even both. But no matter what eect was
responsible for the bondholder's agency loss, the reason why it happened was a dilution of the
bondholder's claim. It is important to note that it is not the entire claim that was diluted, but
16Source: Article in Business Wire, Date: Thursday, March 8, 2001.
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only the embedded claim on hypothetical liquidation proceeds. This is exactly where seniority
clause becomes eective. Figure 2(a) illustrate this. The DVA of an incumbent bondholder with
a senior claim is on the entire grid positive. This has two reasons: The incumbent bondholder is
legally protected against direct debt dilution through the seniority clause. On top of that, there
is no room for indirect dilution through asset substitution. The company is doing an acquisition,
which means that it is expanding its asset base. So even if the incumbent assets are expanded
with extremely risky assets, there are - in the event of a default, which is where the unsecured
claim was vulnerable - still more assets to liquidate and thus in probabilities more liquidation
proceeds to satised the senior claim. The only way to dilute the claim would be to siphon assets
out of the company i.e. to reduce the asset base. This is sometimes called asset dilution. For
a secured bond that would be a breach of contract - the assets to be spun o are pledge as a
collateral - and it is assumed that this does not happen. But it is this what the bondholders
were concerned about in the Marriot spin o of 1993. There the equityholders were about to
reduce the asset base of the company and thus reducing the value of the incumbent bondholder.
Empirical evidence in Maxwell and Rao (2003) arms more generally, that spin-os are poten-
tially diluting for incumbent bondholders.
The shape of the DVA however, is similar to the one of an unsecured bond: The less risk, the
more is there to gain for the incumbent senior bondholder. The explanations for that is that the
senior bond's payo is still - despite the seniority clause - concave and thus the bond's value is
decreasing in risk. The more risky the assets are, the more likely is default and thus the value
added of the incumbent bond must be decreasing in risk. The overall conclusion is therefore that
a seniority clause protects the incumbent bondholder almost perfectly from agency costs caused
by acquisitions, but it does not change the shape of the claim, it is still concave.
The equityholder faces a trade o that is altered compared with the unsecured bond since in this
situation he may suer and agency problem. This is presented in gure 2(b). The equityholder
has still a claim which is increasing in risk and thus for most of the grid, the best acquisition
for him is one that is very risky. But an additional eect is now more clearly visible. The equi-
tyholder has two ways in which he may increase the value of his claim through an acquisition:
One is by relying on the convexity of his claim and thus increasing the risk - a positive17 risk
eect. The other is in reducing his share of the acquisition costs i.e. reducing the amount of
capital he has to contribute to the acquisition - a capital eect. Why would the capital outlay
matter? This capital eect is related to the debt overhang problem rst noted in Myers (1977)
17Positive for the equityholder.
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and is an agency problem as well: In the standard debt overhang problem, the face value of
the incumbent debt is higher than the expected payo of the assets and as a consequence of
that, an additional investment by the equityholder would - at least in part - be absorbed by the
incumbent bondholders. The debt is then called underwater. The bondholder's DVA in gure
2(a) is decreasing in risk i.e. the lower the risk the more the bondholder prots form the value
added created by the acquisition. Thus he is proting from the equityholder's capital outlay -
without contributing to it. So in some sense the incumbent bondholder is the agency player here.
In the most part of the grid in gure 2(b), the risk eect is dominating. Towards the west corner
of gure 2(b), the capital eect starts to dominate and thus the EVA is decreasing instead of
increasing in risk. This is because leverage is decreasing with risk and the best choice for the
equityholder in that region is to lever the acquisition as much as possible and thus reducing the
capital outlay. This may be surprising but it is perfectly rational. In the middle of the grid,
neither eect plays and the company nds itself in a debt overhang problem. The capital eect
inuences an unsecured bond as well. However, with an unsecured bond debt dilution is more
eective than the capital eect.18
There is some anecdotal evidence on that: In 2007, the Mexican cement company Cemex took
over the Australian cement and building materials company Rinker. Although Rinker was from
Australia, up to 80% of its sales were generated in North America. Cemex was already present
in the North American market, Rinker's geographical presence was very dierent from Cemex's
presence. At this point in time, the North American market was thought to be a low risk market
for building materials. Moreover, the market has still strong regional dierence i.e. the regions
are not very correlated.19 Overall the acquisition was not expected to increase risk. Inline with
the implications of this model, the capital eect was dominating and the Rinker acquisition was
essentially a buyout, mostly funded with debt.20.
The reverse happened two years later: Holcim also announced in 2009 that it will take a substan-
tial stake in the Chinese cement company Huaxin Cement21. Holcim was not really present then
in China i.e. this was - particularly after the meltdown in the emerging markets construction
sector in 2008 - a risky acquisition. This transaction was - in line with the insights that the
model in this paper delivers - nanced with a capital increase in Holcim.
18In gure 1(c) the capital eect is visible towards the west corner, in gure 1(d) the risk eect dominates so
much, that the capital eect disappears.
19This still holds true within the United States. The eect on residential property price of the subprime
meltdown was very heterogenous. While prices in California or Florida were heavily down, Texas property still
generated very low positive returns.
20Source: Corporate Presentations of Cemex.
21Source: Company press release, June 15, 2009.
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In terms of quantity, the bondholder's value shift that occurs as a result of the acquisition, is
always positive. He may gain 1% 5% on the acquisition. This is remarkable and may give room
to capital structure arbitrage around mergers and acquisitions. The presence of a seniority clause
reduces the gains for the equityholder. Which were with an unsecured bond at 1%  6% with a
value maximizing capital structure and 2%   9% with an equity maximizing capital structure -
to below 0%  2:5% and leaves no room for agency gains through acquisitions. Since there is no
room for agency, there is also no room for welfare loss.
III) Callable bond
Textbooks like Brealey et al. (1981) and sales presentation often suggest that callable bonds are
essentially issued because of two reasons: First, in order to give the issuer the option to renance
the bond if the reference interest rate signicantly falls or second, to give the issuer the option
to renance the bond if the company's rating improves. Consequently, high yield bonds are
often callable. The rst motive is not relevant in this paper. In this model, credit spreads solely
depend on the company's risk prole and on the company's leverage. The risk free rate is not
stochastic. The second motive is not relevant as well, since it is only a two period model.
There is however a third, new rational for callable bonds: In a situation with an incumbent senior
bond, the DVA was always positive i.e. the seniority clause forces the equityholder to share the
value added of an acquisition with the incumbent bondholders. The equityholder leaves money
on the table. This is the reason why a right to redeem the bond early may be valuable to
the equityholder, even in the absence of the usual rationals for embedded options in corporate
bonds. They allow the equityholder to renance an incumbent bond with a new bond covering
company's entire demand for external capital. This new bond can then be sold at fair value,
instead of leaving money on the table for the incumbent bondholders. It allows the equityholder
to have a fresh start and thus implement an exactly optimal capital structure. Since calling the
bond implies that the entire capital structure is revised and a new, large bond is issued at fair
value, there is no room for agency here. What is presented in gure 3(a) is only the EVA of an
acquisition that has an optimal post acquisition capital structure with only one straight bond
and equity. The other gures are irrelevant, since the incumbent bond is renanced.
It may be surprising that the optimal acquisition would one be in the west corner of gure 3(a)
i.e. with low risk. There are again the capital eect and the risk eect that enter the trade o
here. The equity claim is still convex and even the assets on a company's books are in some
sense a convex claim, since the company is protected by limited liability. For most of the grid
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in gure 3(a), the capital eect is dominating. But as is also visible, at about 2 = 0:3 the slope
of the EVA plane is reversed and - if the 2-axis would be widened - further east, in the region
2 2 [0:4; 0:5] the EVA would surpass the EVA level in the west corner. The risk eect only starts
to dominate this trade o at a high level of asset volatility and is the dominant value creator for
an almost unrealistic level of asset volatility.22
Not only enables an embedded call option the equityholder to claim all the value added of an
acquisition, it might even be a way of signalling that the company is sorting out hypothetical
agency conicts. Or it might also be a form of precaution against potential allegation that the
company tries to extract agency rents. It is occasionally observed on the market that debt is
renance after an acquisition. When the Swiss duty-free shop operator Dufry took over the
American Hudson Group in September 2008, it was expanding into a new region namely the
United States and into the less concentrated duty-paid business. Although the acquisition was
nanced primarily with equity, the entire debt of Dufry and Hudson was replace by a new debt
facility, and thus leaving no money on the table for the incumbent Dufry debt holders.23
IV) CLO
A CLO is a bond that is secured with a specic asset, placed in a bankruptcy remote entity. A
CLO has an advantage for both stakeholder: Since the assets are placed in separate entities, one
entity is not inuenced by the other and thus DVA is zero over the entire grid and is not plotted.
The bondholder is therefore protected against every possible form of agency mentioned so far,
debt dilution, asset dilution and asset substitution. So from the bondholder's perspective, this
form of debt contract makes sense, when agency costs are a potential issue. As it was mentioned
earlier, this is especially the case when risk is high.
The equityholder has an advantage as well: Since the acquisition is brought into a new entity,
the equityholder may reduce that he potentially leaves money on the table. The EVA surface
for the CLO is presented in gure 3(b). Because the acquisition is held by a subsidiary rather
than the original company, the correlation  with the incumbent assets does not inuence the
optimal capital structure of the subsidiary. The default risk is separated. As it is visible in gure
3(b), a CLO make sense for the equityholder, if risk is either very high or very low. On the low
risk side, the equityholder may reduce the money left on the table. On the high risk side, the
equityholder may reduce nancing costs through a separation of the bankruptcy risk. He may
also take advantage of additional limited liability as this was discussed in Leland (2007).
22This might to some extend be driven by the static structure of the model.
23Source: H1-08 analyst's presentation of Dufry.
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The present form of debt contract was and is still common for companies in businesses which are
capital intensive. Examples would be energy upstream, airlines or cement making. Also they
were extensively used to renance all kinds of mortgages.
Another example for the use of securitization would be the now bankrupt Enron. Enron made
extensive use of securitization before its default. It nanced its merchant assets to a large extend
with debt through various subsidiaries. In 1999 Enron North America24 pooled a group of
loans to its merchant assets in the United States into a trust sold them as Collateralized Loan
Obligations (CLO).25 There is no information what kind of loans Enron pooled in that CLO, but
Enron's new merchant assets were - compared with the original gas pipeline and gas wholesale
business - fairly risky.26 At the time the CLO was issued Enron was heavily acquiring risky
assets. This CLO was therefore an ideal solution to avoid agency conicts27 in the future with
the bondholders - on top of that - leaving no money on the table for bondholders to other project
not included in the CLO.
V) Convertible bond
In textbooks, convertible bonds are often praised as sweetened debt i.e. as an instrument to
reduce credit spreads by letting the bondholder prot from the upside. This is undoubtedly
one feature of convertible bonds, but as odd it may seem, in the base case of this model, i.e.
prior to an acquisition, it is inecient to issue a convertible bond. This is because exercising
the conversion option destroys the tax shield. This has the consequence, that it pushes up the
conversion bound.
The DVAs of the convertible bond are presented in gures 4(a) and 4(b) for a value maximizing
capital structure as well as for an equity maximizing capital structure. The incumbent bond-
holder has now two parts that drive the value of his position. One is the embedded conversion
option, whose payo is convex in shape, the other is the bond part of the convertible bond whose
payo is concave in shape. The shape of the DVAs in gures 4(a) and 4(b) similar to a standard
bond i.e. the bond part of the convertible bond is driving the bondholder's added value in shape.
But by comparing gure 4(a) to gure 1(a), it can be noticed that the shape of the DVA surface is
similar, the level of the convertible bonds DVA surface is however dierent. This is the inuence
24A subsidiary of Enron, holding most merchant assets in the United States.
25Enron did a series of transaction with loans that were at least questionable if not illegal. This CLO transaction
did - according to Powers et al. (2002) - NOT belong to this group.
26Jerey Skillings is heard saying We like risk, because you make money by taking on risk. in the movie Enron,
the smartest guys in the room of 2005.
27Remember, most of Enron's story is about corporate governance or agency issues between Enron and its
shareholders and not between Enron and its creditors.
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of the conversion option,
The welfare loss, that is illustrated in gure 4(g), is with 1:8% to 2:5% remarkable in size. Con-
version options are therefore not only vulnerable from the bondholders perspective, but may also
be inconvenient for a potential social planner. Striking is the shape of the welfare loss surface.
It is not the worse the more risk there is but the worst region is somewhere in the middle. The
agency games are - not surprisingly - more ecient with increasing risk.
Looking at the DVA in gure 4(b) as well as at the DAC in gure 4(e) it is also clear, that the
convertible bond is vulnerable to agency issues. A convertible bond is a hybrid nancing instru-
ment, an as mentioned earlier. I assume that the additional straight debt can be issued senior
to the convertible bond. The rst agency problem is equivalent to the one with the unsecured
straight bond. The equityholder may engage in diluting the incumbent bondholder's claim by is-
suing straight debt. He can reinforce that with asset substitution i.e. by doing a risk acquisition.
This is the rst reason why the a convertible bond in this model is vulnerable to agency problem.
The second agency problem is related to the conversion option and is again an agency problem
that is related to the Myers (1977) the debt overhang problem: The equityholder has no incen-
tive to put up additional capital for the company. Through the embedded conversion option,
the incumbent bondholders would prot from a hypothetical investment that the equityholder
helps to nance. A convertible bond is underwater when the conversion option dominates the
value of the bond. This is problem is further worsen by presence of the anti dilution clause. The
conversion option is written on non diluted equity whereas the equityholder holds diluted equity.
The convertible bond suers in a way a constant debt overhang problem. This underinvestment
problem of the equityholder is illustrated in the special gures 4(h) and 4(i). They illustrate
the surface of leverage ratios of the company after the acquisition for a value maximizing cap-
ital structure in gure 4(h) and for an equity maximizing capital structure in gure 4(i). The
leverage ratio in gure 4(i) is across the entire surface higher than in gure 4(h). This reects
exactly the equityholder's lack of incentive to contribute additional capital to the company. The
equityholder tries to neutralize the debt overhang problem with excess leverage. The potential
agency losses that are illustrated in gure 4(e), are remarkably in size, namely between 8% and
18%. Investors in convertible bonds therefore have to monitor the company's nancing and M&A
activities closely.
The equityholder looses under a value maximizing capital structure on every acquisition on this
grid as illustrated in gure 4(c). This is a direct consequence of the convertible bond's debt over-
hang problem mentioned in the last paragraph. Under an equity maximizing capital structure,
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the equityholder may make rather large gains on acquisitions as illustrated in gure 4(d). About
half of these gains are attributed to agency as illustrated in gure 4(f). All these surfaces are
increasing in risk.
The market is well aware of the opportunities and problems that occur with convertible bonds in
acquisitions. During the rst half of 2009, the Australian uranium exploration company Scim-
itar Resources took over the fellow Australian metal and noble metal mining company Jackson
Minerals to became Cauldron Energy. In the month where the acquisition took eect (June
2009), the company issued a new convertible bond to - among other things - redeem an existing
convertible bond of Scimitar Resources.28 The target is an exploration company, the acquisition
can therefore be considered as a risky one.
In another example, Satcom Technology, a supplier of technology for alternative energy sources
announced in 2007 that it will accelerate its growth in the alternative energy market which meant
to mean to growth through acquisitions. At the same time they announced that they would raise
new external capital under their existing promissory notes program to nance there growth and
to retire an existing convertible bond.29
These two examples show that the market is well aware of the agency problems that can occur
with incumbent convertible bonds. In both cases, the agency loss seemed to be sever enough
that both companies could not aord to jeopardize their reputation as a debtor by not buying
out the incumbent bondholder prior to the expansion.
Sometimes convertible bonds even have voting rights on fundamental change i.e. they have some
bargaining power. In 2005 the London-based Crew Gold took over the fellow London-based
Guinor Gold. Both companies are gold mining and gold exploration companies. The acquisition
was nanced with debt as well as equity and was subject to approval of both, the incumbent
Crew Gold equityholders as well the incumbent holders of a Crew Gold convertible bond. The
Crew Gold convertible bond was protected against additional borrowing.30
A company issuing a convertible bond, may signal with that, that it considers itself to be a
mature company. In 2005 Intel, a former technology bubble highyer issued a convertible bond.
This was viewed by the market as a sign that the growth of Intel is coming to an end.
28Source: Company Presentation 2009 of Cauldron Energy.
29Source: Company press release, Nov. 9, 2007.
30Source: Company press release, November 21, 2005.
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B. The bankruptcy costs perspective
With the earlier denition of a perspective, the bankruptcy costs perspective is a mesh over a
grid of average annual asset volatility (2) - in a way the master parameter - and bankruptcy
costs (). In some sense this is another risk perspective, since bankruptcy costs are hypothetical
losses in default.
I) Unsecured straight bond
For an unsecured straight bond, this is presented in gure 5. For a value maximizing capital
structure after the acquisition, gures 5(a) and 5(c) illustrate what one would expect: The higher
the bankruptcy costs the less added value is there to gain. For the incumbent bondholder, this
is a direct consequence of a high loss given default when bankruptcy costs are high. For the
equityholder the consequence is indirect: The equityholder receives nothing in default, but the
higher the bankruptcy costs, the large are the nancing costs. That is why the equityholder's
EVA surface is similar in shape in the bankruptcy costs direction, but reversed in the asset
volatility direction.
What is more interesting is the equity maximizing post acquisition capital structure. At rst -
by only looking at the EVA in gure 5(f) and the EAG in gure 5(d) - it looks fairly standard.
The more risk and the less bankruptcy costs, the more is there to gain in value and agency for
the equityholder. But what is not reected in these previous gures, but becomes evident in
gures 5(e), 5(g) and 5(h), is that the equityholder is actually doing a trade o between agency
gains and costs of additional leverage. This is illustrated in the special gure 5(h), that plots
the dierence between the leverage ratio under a value maximizing capital structure and an
equity maximizing capital structure. When the costs of bankruptcy are modest, then the costs
of additional debt are modest and the equityholder may use this additional debt to dilute the
incumbent debt claim. But with bankruptcy costs growing, the costs for the additional debt
begins to raise and this limits the application of excess leverage for debt dilution. That is why
the DAC surface in gure 5(e) has a kink in the middle. That's where the trade o starts to
turn. Excess leverage becomes costly and only the costs of a smaller tranche of excess leverage
are oset by agency gains. Since the excess leverage that is taken on for debt dilution is directly
causing a welfare loss, the shape of the welfare loss surface in gure 5(g) shares the shape with
the DAC surface. The EAG surface in gure 5(f) and the EVA surface 5(d) are however not
aected by this kink, since the equityholder - for himself - does a smooth trade o between
agency gains and costs of debt.
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II) Senior bond
The results for a senior bond are reported in gures 6(a) and 6(b). For the senior bond, the DVA
is - as to expect - decreasing in the level of bankruptcy costs. What is rather surprising is the
shape of the EVA surface, it is namely increasing in bankruptcy costs. The reason for that is
again the debt overhang problem that the seniority clause bears. Since the equityholder's payo
is zero in default, assets with low bankruptcy costs only increase the value of the incumbent
bondholders' claim through the seniority clause. The size of the debt overhang problem is
decreasing in bankruptcy costs which is what leads to this unusual shape of the EVA surface and
it is what makes the equityholder favor a regime with high bankruptcy costs.
III) Callable bond and CLO
The results for a callable bond and a CLO are reported in gures 7(a) and 7(b). There is nothing
unexpected to report for these two contracts. Both contracts allow for a new trade o - may it
be through separate entities or a fresh start in the same entity - and thus they have an EVA
surface that is decreasing in bankruptcy costs. Since bankruptcy costs directly drive costs of the
new debt, the equityholder has an incentive to keep the bankruptcy costs as low as possible.
IV) Convertible bond
The EVAs for a convertible bond are presented in gures 8(a) - 8(g). What may seem surprising is
that - contrary to all the other bonds - under both, a value maximizing and an equity maximizing
capital structure, the DVA surface is over most of the grid increasing in bankruptcy costs. The
EVA however, is over most of the grid decreasing in bankruptcy costs. The latter was observed
before, but not the former. The explanation for that is the hybrid structure of the convertible
bond.
For the bondholder, the question is what part of the bond dominates. When bankruptcy costs
are low, then the convertible bond is in the area of debt i.e. it is in a way a busted convertible
bond31. This is because when bankruptcy is not very costly the acquisition is mainly nanced
with debt and then the conversion bound XCV - being an increasing function of additional debt
- is high and thus the probability of conversion is low. The value of a busted convertible bond is
equivalent to an unsecured bond. In gure 5(a), DVA in is in the region where the convertible
bond is in the area of debt positive, but very low. Since the convertible bond is an unsecured bond
and junior to potential new straight bond, a busted convertible bond is vulnerable to agency.
31A busted convertible bond, is a convertible bond where conversion is unlikely.
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This is why under an equity maximizing capital structure, the claim is diluted with new straight
debt. DVA for that situation in gure 8(b) is negative in the region where the convertible bond
is in the area of debt. The same holds true for the DAC in gure 8(e), which is very negative
in the region where the convertible bond is in the are of debt. Since the excess leverage from
agency also leads to a welfare loss, the welfare loss in gure 8(g) is very pronounced in the region
where the convertible bond is busted.
Equivalent to the situation with an unsecured straight bond, under an equity maximizing capital
structure the equityholder is enabled to take advantage of debt agency in the region where the
convertible bond is in the area of debt. That is reected in gure 8(d) and gure 8(f). EVA as
well as EAG are high in the region where the convertible bond is in the are of debt.
With increasing bankruptcy costs, the debt part of the convertible bond looses value and the
conversion option becomes the dominant part of the convertible bond. The bond is then in the
area of equity. In this region the equityholder faces the problem, namely the convertible bond's
constant debt overhang problem. The equityholder has an incentive to increase leverage i.e. to
keep his own capital contribution as low as possible. This is however no longer possible when
bankruptcy costs are high because this also means that the costs of new debt are high. On top of
that the success of classical debt agency is limited since the equityholder cannot compensate the
high costs of debt with agency gains. The equityholder cannot compensate his underinvestment
incentive with leverage, but he can also not compensate it with agency gains. As a consequence
of that EVA in the region where the convertible bond is in the area of equity in gure 8(d) is
negative. This implies that in this region, the equity cannot overcome the debt overhang problem
and thus the equityholder is better o not doing the acquisition. The conversion option may
therefore prevent positive NPV acquisitions with high bankruptcy costs.
The bondholder prots from that rather hypothetical situation. Debt agency looses its power,
so DAC in gure 8(e) are almost zero in the region where the convertible bond is in the are of
equity. The equityholder's (hypothetical) capital injection is mainly consumed by the incumbent
bondholders in the region where the convertible bond is in the area of equity as illustrated in
gure 8(b). Since there is not much room left for excess leverage to serve agency purposes, the
welfare loss in gure 8(g) is also almost zero in the region where the convertible bond is in the
are of equity.
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V) A note on the size of the value shifts
Since the questions in the intro do not only aim to make an assessment in terms of the direction
of value added and value shifts but also in terms of the order of magnitude, some words about it
for the bankruptcy perspective. Except for the convertible bond, EVA for realistic bankruptcy
costs are between 2% and 5%. DVA is between  4% and 4%, depending if the overall value or
the equity value was the basis of the capital structure trade o. For the convertible bond which
include an embedded option, this option increases the range of the upsides as well as the range
of the downside32 and the gures run up to  =+ 20%. Welfare loss is between 1% and 2%.
Looking at the numbers, the level bankruptcy costs has an impact on a relevant level on the size
of value shifts during acquisition. There is an impact of remarkable level across all contracts.
This especially for assets with high bankruptcy costs. So inline with Yagil (1989) - where this
was conrmed empirically - bankruptcy costs are in important nancial parameter that should
be considered when assessing a potential acquisition.
C. The tax perspective
With the earlier denition of a perspective, the tax perspective is a mesh over a grid of the
master parameter average annual asset volatility (2) and the tax rates (). But it might be
more accurate to call it a leverage ratio perspective, since the corporate tax rate has a direct
eect on leverage.
I) Unsecured straight bond
The results for an unsecured straight bond are presented in gure 9. As mentioned at the
beginning, the tax rate has a direct impact on the company's ex ante leverage ratio. On the one
hand, the higher the tax rat is, the more room is there for a tax shield and thus the higher is
the leverage ratio. But on the other hand, the higher the leverage ratio, the less room is there
to play games with excess leverage. Under both, a value maximizing capital structure and an
equity maximizing capital structure, the bondholder favors a regime with a high tax rate for an
acquisition - as presented in gures 9(a) and 9(b).
For the equityholder, the preferred tax regime depends on the risk of the acquisition. If the
risk of the new assets is low, then for both, a value maximizing capital structure and an equity
maximizing capital structure, the equityholder prefers a regime with a low tax rat as presented in
gures 9(c) and 9(d). Otherwise too much of the leverage capacity has to be reserved for the tax
32Through the debt overhang problem.
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shield. There remains little exibility either to install a value maximizing capital structure or for
agency. Also with a high incumbent leverage ratio, a high tax rate and low risk, the equityholder
faces another debt overhang like problem. He has to contribute fairly much to the acquisition
in terms of capital, since the company's capacity for additional leverage is low. The bondholder
may then once more prot form that investment, since there is then more unlevered after tax
asset value available. This can be observed in gure 9(h) which plots the dierence between the
pre-acquisition and the post acquisition leverage ratio for a value maximizing capital structure.
When the acquisition is one with low risk and the tax rate is high, then there is a lot more
room to increase the leverage ratio that there would be if the tax rate would be low. Since the
equityholder cannot overcome this debt overhang problem, his EVA - as presented in gure 9(c)
- is negative in the eastern corner and the acquisition is undesirable. The same problem holds
true for an equity maximizing capital structure - presented in gure 9(d) - when risk is low and
the tax rate is high.
When the risk of the acquired assets are high, the trade o is dierent. The equityholder's debt
overhang problem becomes less important and asset substitution becomes more important. If
the incumbent leverage ratio is high as a result of the high tax rate, then the equityholder can
dilute the incumbent bondholder's claim by acquiring risky assets - classical asset substitution.
That is illustrated in gures 9(c) and 9(d) in the north corner. This is less ecient when the
tax rate is low. Then there is less leverage in place and thus less debt that can be diluted. And
potential newly issued debt - which is expensive when the risk is high - has to be issued at fair
value. Asset substitution - which is the agency issue here - is also what is driving the EAG in
gure 9(f) - the surface is leaning towards the north corner.
Under an equity maximizing capital structure, the DVA in gure 9(b), the DAC in 9(e), the
welfare loss in gure 9(g) as well as the dierence in ex ante and ex post leverage ratio in gures
9(h) and 9(i) experience a reversion of the slope in the middle, similar to the one observed in the
bankruptcy cost perspective in gure 5. The equityholder is trading o two eects here, namely
benets from claim dilution against costs of excess debt. When walking up that tax rate axis
from zero, then the excess leverage increases - and with that the agency costs and the welfare
loss. But then further up the grid, this is reversed. Then excess leverage becomes very costly
and is reduced. This is why the peak of excess leverage and thus the bottom of welfare loss is
somewhere in the interior.
31
II) Senior bond, callable bond and CLO
For the senior bond, the DVA and the EVA surfaces are presented in gures 10(a) and 10(b).
This trade o is with respect to acquisitions as one would expect: The bondholder favors a high
tax rate, because then there is not much nancial exibility left and not a lot of room for agency.
For the equityholder, the situation is exactly reversed. As it is presented in gure 10(b), for high
tax rates the EVA is negative and thus the acquisition is not desirable for the equityholder. This
is because of the debt overhang problem that the seniority clause bears and that is worsen by a
high tax rate.
The EVA surface for a renance callable bond presented in gure 11(a) is increasing in the tax
rate. This might be surprising. The result is driven by the assumption that assets are traded at
its unlevered after tax value. Then the higher the interest rate, the larger is the tax shield that
the company can generate by leveraging the asset.
The EVA of the CLO is presented in gure 11(b). With the CLO, the acquisition is leveraged
separately. Similar to the callable bond, the EVA is increasing in the tax rate, since the newly
acquired assets are traded at it's unlevered after tax value.
III) Convertible bond
The situation with the convertible bond is more complicated, since two payo proles are mixed.
It was noted earlier, exercising the conversion option bears a loss in tax shield. In Stein (1992)
convertible bonds were termed backdoor equity nancing. The loss in tax shield is in some sense
a negative consequences of that. The level of the tax rate inuences the likeliness of conversion
and thus the region in which the conversion option dominates the convertible bond's value. The
loss in tax shield is increasing with the tax rate, conversion is therefore more likely when the tax
rate is low. This is why DVA for both approaches to maximize the capital structure in gures
12(a) and 12(b), is high at the lower end of the tax rate axis. The option part of the bond
dominates there.
The equityholder is again stuck with the constant debt overhang problem that the conversion
option bears. The EVA surface in gure 12(c) and 12(d) is decreasing towards the lower end
of the tax rate axis - the region were conversion is likely - which reects the equityholders debt
overhang problem. It is also illustrated in the special gure 12(h) which presents the company's
ex post dierence in leverage ratio between a value maximizing and an equity maximizing capital
structure. The excess leverage in gure 12(h) is increasing towards the lower end of the tax rate
axis, since the equityholder has an incentive to use debt instead of equity, since there is a wide
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nancial exibility. This excess leverage is diluting to the incumbent bondholder's claim, but it
is not the bond part that is aected - it is not dominating - but the option part of the convertible
bond. This is because the excess leverage shrinks the value of the equity and thus lowers the value
of the incumbent bondholder's hypothetical equity stake. It is a form of claim dilution. This is
why - despite the high excess leverage - DAC in gure 12(e) are raising steeply towards the lower
end of the tax rate axis, but the welfare loss in gure 12(g) is only moderately increasing. The
agency gains of the equityholder in that situation on gure 12(f) are only moderate, since the
equityholder is not trying to generate agency gains but is rather trying to avoid agency losses
resulting from the debt overhang problem.
On the other end of the tax rate axis - the higher end - the situation is similar to the unsecured
straight bond. In that area the bond part of the convertible bond is dominating its ex ante value
- the convertible bond is busted. The equityholder is then again in the position to dilute the
incumbent bondholder's claim, by taking on excess leverage and acquiring risky assets. The EVA
in gures 12(c) and 12(d) as well as EAG in gure 12(f) are - as a result of asset substitution -
higher when the acquired asset's annual volatility is high.
At the high end of the tax rate axis, there is a lot of tax shield to gain for the equityholder,
since assets are assumed to be traded at its unlevered after tax value. But also at the high end
of the tax rate axis, a lot of the company's leverage capacity is already used to create a tax
shield. There is not much room for excess leverage to generate agency gains as illustrated in
gure 12(h). The agency gains from excess leverage in gure 12(f) and the excess leverage itself
in gure 12(h) are therefore not the highest at the high end of the tax rate axis, but somewhere
in the middle, where the convertible bond slides from the area of equity to the area of debt. Or
to put that in other words, the agency gains are the highest at the point where the dominating
part of the convertible bond is switched from the option part to the bond part.
What is now interesting to see is that - despite the fact that agency through excess leverage is the
most ecient in the middle of the grid - generating EVA by taking advantage of the tax shield
is creating more value under an equity maximizing capital structure than taking advantage of
agency. EVA in gure 12(d) is higher at the high end of the tax rate axis than in the middle,
where agency is the most ecient. So if a convertible bond is the incumbent bond, a high tax
rate tends to bust the incumbent convertible bond in the event of an acquisition. But it also
oers some protection to the incumbent bondholder against agency, since under a high tax rate
agency through excess leverage becomes unattractive.
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IV) A note on the size of the value shifts
The size of the inuence of a change in tax rate to the value shifts is in the range of 8% for bonds
without options and up to 30% for realistic gures for a convertible bond. The reason for that
dierence is the potential destructive eect of conversion options on the tax shield. This seems
high compared with Graham (2000), who estimated the tax benet of debt to be between 4%
and 10%. The model in this paper clearly overestimates the tax benets to debt. This is because
the model is a static model of capital structure which tend to overestimate leverage ratios and
thus tax benets of leverage. A dynamics model like Goldstein et al. (2001) would allow for
more decent leverage ratios, but would also tremendously increase the complexity of analyzing
structured debt contracts and acquisitions.
Are tax benets/losses of acquisitions therefore of negligible size? Academic and anecdotal
evidence suggests that the answer is no. Lewellen (1971) rst suggested tax benets as a reason
for an acquisition. Brealey et al. (1981) however, list tax benet from acquisitions under dubious
reasons for mergers. But it seems that their categorization in sensible and dubious reasons for
mergers would be largely equivalent to a categorization into economic and nancial reasons for
mergers. So Brealey et al. (1981) generally have doubt that there are nancial reasons for an
acquisition. The results in Leland (2007) as well as the results in this paper suggest that there
are nancial reasons for an acquisition.
Tax issues are an important part of every due diligence prior to an acquisitions. This is to some
extend because of scal positions that occur as a result of the implementation of the merger e.g.
legal restructuring or deferred taxes that must be realized.
4 What is a good contract...
This chapter aims at transferring the above analysis in recommendations for companies where
unexpected acquisitions are potentially an issue. It is therefore set to answer 6 that was posed
at the beginning.
A. ...when risk is the main concern?
A simple unsecured straight bond is not a good choice. It is vulnerable to agency - especially
when the risk is high. Although one would expect companies to avoid to generate agency gains
- they want to keep a clean credit history - it is in an actually case dicult to determined if the
gains that the shareholder make from the acquisition are a result of value added or of agency. If
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both, the debt certicates and the shares are listed, the price movements and the movements in
volatility may give a hint of what happens, but it is still dicult to tell. But even in the absence
of agency, the equityholder favors risky acquisitions as a result of the convexity of his claim. The
straight bond however is a concave claim and favors save acquisitions.
It has been discussed in the last section, how the situation changes when one of the following
contractual features is added to the debt contract: A seniority clause, an early redemption clause,
bankruptcy remoteness and an embedded conversion option. Unless the acquisition is negative
i.e. it is a spin-o, a seniority clause oers almost perfect protection against debt dilution and
asset substitution. It creates however a new agency problem that is similar to debt overhang. It is
especially strong when the risk of the acquisition is somewhat similar to the assets in place. Then
most of the added value of the acquisition is absorbed by the bondholders and the acquisition
looses attractiveness for the equityholder.
An embedded call option oers a solution to this problem. It allows the equityholder to redeem
the incumbent bond and renance it with a bond issued at fair value. Within the scope of this
model, an early redemption clause solves the debt overhang problem associated with the seniority
clause. A similar argument is made in Childs et al. (2005), but with short term debt rather than
with callable debt. Callable bond often include a penalty fee, so this option to restructure is -
as opposed to the model in this paper - costly. But as recognized in Hennessy and Tserlukevich
(2008), this penalty fee is tax deductible like interest, which brings the cost of the option to
restructure down.
Securitization is a dierent solution to the two agency problems mentioned above. Leland (2007)
argues that there are large benets from securitization when the company backs the CLO with
assets that are very save (2 = 0:04) or that are very risky (2 = 0:5). Figure 3(c) presents the
dierence in EVA between securitization and restructuring an incumbent callable bond. I use a
bit dierent numbers, but I conrm that securitization is valuable for high risk assets. On the
other end of the scale there is no advantage of securitizing a low risk acquisition but I do not go
as deep down the scale as in Leland (2007).33
A convertible bond is rather messy when it comes to an acquisition. It is vulnerable to agency and
the conversion option creates a debt overhang problem for risky acquisitions. Anecdotal evidence
presented earlier, shows that convertible bonds are frequently renanced around acquisitions
sometimes the bondholders even have some of the bargaining power. Taking evidence from this
33The median annual asset volatility of a AAA-rated company is estimated at 0:21 by Schaefer and Strebulaev
(2008). Although the value in Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) might be overestimated, it is to doubt if there
exist corporate assets that are as deep down the lower end of the volatility scale as in Leland (2007). In 2007,
residential mortgage were thought to be at that low level - today the assessment would probably be dierent.
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model, it makes sense to issue convertible bonds callable to avoid the potential problems around
an acquisition. In Vanden (2009) an altered payo structure for a convertible bond is proposed
that - within his framework - solves the agency problems associated with a convertible bond
around an acquisition. However, I think there is a legal and an economic problem associated
with that payo structure: I doubt whether an instrument with the payo structure in Vanden
(2009) would be classied as debt by the tax authority or the bankruptcy court, more likely it
will be classied as hidden equity. Furthermore, the payo structure is such that default occurs
when asset values are high. This leads to high ex post bankruptcy costs and thus increases the
cost of debt.
The overall recommendation from the evidence of the model in this paper would be to issue
the incumbent debt callable and with a seniority clause. If the acquisition is very risky, then
securitizing the acquisition makes sense. A convertible bond ought to be issued callable, to avoid
potential problems around an acquisition.
B. ...when bankruptcy costs are the main concern?
The issues for an unsecured straight bond are similar to the risk perspective but dierent in order
of magnitude. Agency issues are the most pronounced somewhere in the middle of the grid at an
average level and they are low for very high and very low bankruptcy costs. A regime with low
bankruptcy costs is favorable for the equityholder. For this regime, there are almost no agency
costs for the incumbent bondholder. For high bankruptcy costs agency is reduced, but does not
entirely disappear.
A seniority clause reverses the equityholder's trade o: As a result of the debt overhang problem
associated with that clause, the equityholder favors now a regime with high bankruptcy costs.
This makes it problematic.
A call option preserves the shape of the EVA, the equityholder favors a regime with low bankruptcy
costs. For securitization - the call option's rival - Gorton and Souleles (2007) put forward, that
bankruptcy cost consideration are the most important motive for asset securitization and that
companies with risky assets and high bankruptcy costs are likely to securitize assets. Figure 7(c)
presents the dierence in EVA between securitization and restructuring an incumbent callable
bond. As opposed to Gorton and Souleles (2007) and similar to Leland (2007), this dierence is
low over the entire grid. The dierence is the largest 1:5% when the assets have low bankruptcy
costs and high risk.
If a convertible bond is the incumbent bond, then the situation is - from an agency perspective -
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ambivalent: On the one hand, the bankruptcy costs inuence the likelihood of actual conversion
of a convertible bond. Everything being equal, the higher the bankruptcy costs, the more is the
conversion option worth relative to the bond part of the convertible bond - the convertible bond
is in the area of equity. So when bankruptcy costs are high, the equityholder's debt overhang
problem is more sever and he has no incentive to pursue acquisitions. On the other hand, when
bankruptcy costs are low, the bond part dominates the situation - the convertible bond is in the
area of debt. The convertible bond is junior to any new debt and thus very vulnerable to agency.
The bottom line for the convertible bond is, that it is vulnerable to agency around acquisitions
and the level of bankruptcy costs determine which stakeholder suers from the agency costs.
Again a convertible bond should be issued callable.
The overall recommendation for a regime with low bankruptcy costs is unsecured straight debt or
securitization. The rst recommendation is because claim dilution through acquisitions is nearly
impossible when bankruptcy costs are low. Also under unsecured straight debt, the equityholder
actually favors a regime with low bankruptcy costs. This holds across the entire risk grid.
For assets with high risk, securitization is favorable. It makes the equityholder better o than
callable debt, there is no claim dilution and no debt overhang and the seniority clause is poten-
tially harmful for the bondholder. So it is certainly true for the specic case in Leland (2007)
that bankruptcy costs consideration are not relevant in size. A more extensive analysis how-
ever, reveals that - inline with Gorton and Souleles (2007) - bankruptcy cost indeed drive the
application of securitization. In a way both papers are right, Leland (2007) for the specic case
analyzed in section IV.B while Gorton and Souleles (2007) is right in terms of quality and for a
broader consideration.
C. ...when taxes are the main concern?
Taxes help to protect the holder of an unsecured straight bond from agency. This is because
with high taxes, much of the leverage capacity of the company has to be used for a tax shield
and there remains little exibility for excess leverage for agency.
For the same reason, high taxes worsen the debt overhang problem that the equityholder faces
with a seniority clause.
Both, callable debt and securitization favor a high tax rate, since it increases the tax shield
generate with the acquisition. In gure 7(c), the dierence between the EVA after an acquisi-
tion involving a redeemed callable bond and one involving securitization. The tradeo between
callable debt and securitization depends more on risk than it does in the tax rate. Generally, a
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higher tax rate tends to favor callable debt.
The convertible bond is again vulnerable to agency through claim dilution and debt overhang.
It ought to be issued callable.
When the tax rate is low, unsecured debt is vulnerable to agency. The debt overhang associated
to a seniority clause is low and thus a call clause is almost neutral. A callable senior bond is
therefore to favor when taxes are low.
When taxes are high, claim dilution is less of a problem but an unsecure straight bond is still
vulnerable to asset substitution. If the risk of the acquisition is not too high, unsecured straight
debt can be appropriate. If it is not, again callable senior debt is to favor.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature of capital structure by analyzing the impact of an unex-
pected corporate acquisition on a set of dierent incumbent structured debt contracts. Unsecured
debt, senior debt, callable debt, securitization and conversion options were analysed in this pa-
per.
Unsecured debt is vulnerable to claim dilution and asset substitution. By taking on excess lever-
age the equityholder can transfer value from the unsecured straight bond to his own claim. High
risk favors agency costs, while high bankruptcy costs - through high costs of leverage - and a
high tax rate - through the fact that most of the company's debt capacity has to be allocated
to the tax shield - oer some protection from debt agency. But especially the second protection
immediately opens another agency problem, namely one that is similar to debt overhang. The
bondholder is potentially free riding on acquisitions that the equityholder is nancing.
A seniority clause protects the bondholder form debt agency. But it allows the bondholder again
to free ride on the acquisition. With an incumbent bond that has a seniority clause, the equi-
tyholder leaves value added on the table that is absorbed by the bondholder. This problem is
especially pronounced when risk and bankruptcy costs are low.
An new motive was proposed to issue callable bonds. An early redemption clause oers the
equityholder the option to restructure the incumbent debt. The equityholder can renance a
bond that would otherwise forces him to leave money on the table. A seniority clause combined
with a call option is often a good choice for a company where unexpected acquisition might be
an issue. The seniority clause protects the bondholders from agency and the call option makes
sure that there will be no money left on the table.
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Securitization is a structuring tool that applies bankruptcy remoteness. This oers protection
from agency as well against both, claim dilution and debt overhang. It also helps to reduce
the nancing costs of very high risk acquisition by separating the bankruptcy risk and taking
advantage of limited liability.
Incumbent convertible bonds are problematic with acquisitions. When the bond is in the area of
debt it is vulnerable to claim dilution, when it is in the area of equity, the equityholder suers a
constant debt overhang problem. It makes sense to issue convertible bonds callable and anecdo-
tal evidence suggest that convertible bonds are renance around acquisitions.
In terms of order of magnitude, the value added and the value transfers between the claimholders
are of perceivable size, but mostly within single digit percentages. Anecdotal as well as academic
evidence suggests that this is a level that is relevant to the investors implying that careful struc-
turing of debt contracts has not only implications in quality but also in quantity. The welfare
loss from agency is similar to Mauer and Sarkar (2005): not very pronounced and seldom about
1%. It is associated with excess leverage to dilute debt claims.
Finally the question was to answer what a good contract is for companies with potential acqui-
sitions. A callable senior bond oers protection to both forms of the agency problem by adding
protection to the bondholder and exibility to the equityholder. For high risk acquisition it can
be worth while to explore the advantages of bankruptcy remoteness. If risk is low then there is
no need for structuring and simple unsecured straight debt is applicable. Convertible bonds are
problematic around acquisitions and should be redeemed.
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Appendix A: Standard parameter values
Fixed Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Expected present value of asset 1 X01 100
Expected present value of asset 2 X02 100
Annual volatility of asset 1 1 0.22
Conversion ratio of a convertible bond  0:25
Table 1: Values for parameters that are xed.
Fixed Parameters, unless they are part of the examples
Description Parameter Value
Correlation between asset 1 and asset 2 1;2 0:5
Bankruptcy costs  0:23
Corporate tax rate  0:2
Time to maturity T 5 years
Table 2: Values for parameters that are xed unless mentioned otherwise.
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Appendix B: Illustrations on the risk perspective
A. Unsecured straight bond
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
−4
−2
0
2
4
ρ
σ2
D
eb
t V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(a) Debt value added, value max-
imizing capital structure
0
0.5
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
ρ
σ2
D
eb
t V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(b) Debt value added, equity max-
imizing capital structure
0
0.5
1 0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0
2
4
6
8
σ2ρ
Eq
ui
ty
 V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(c) Equity value added, value
maximizing capital structure
0
0.5
1 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
σ2ρ
Eq
ui
ty
 V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(d) Equity value added, equity
maximizing capital structure
0
0.5
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
ρ
σ2
D
eb
t A
ge
nc
y 
Co
st
s 
(%
)
(e) Debt agency costs
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
1
2
3
4
ρσ2
Eq
ui
ty
 A
ge
nc
y 
G
ai
ns
 (%
)
(f) Equity agency gains
0
0.5
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
−0.7
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
ρ
σ2
W
el
fa
re
 L
os
s 
(%
)
(g) Welfare loss
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2
4
6
8
10
12
ρσ2
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 le
ve
ra
ge
 ra
tio
 (le
ve
rag
e r
ati
o i
n (
%)
)
(h) Excess leverage of an equity
maximizing capital structure
Figure 1: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and
the excess leverage of an agency maximizing capital structure of an acquisition for an unsecured
straight bond over a 2=-plane.
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B. Senior secured bond
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(a) Debt value added
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(b) Equity value added
Figure 2: The value added/loss for the stakeholder of an acquisition for a senior secured bond
over a 2=-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital coincide in this case.
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C. Callable bond and CLO
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(a) Equity value added, callable bond that has been
renanced
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(b) Equity value added, CLO
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(c) Dierence in Equity value added between a CLO
and a renanced callable bond
Figure 3: The equity value added/loss of an acquisition for a callable bond that has been re-
nanced and a CLO over a 2=-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital
coincide in this case.
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D. Convertible Bond
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Figure 4: The value added/loss, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and the post acquisition
leverage ratios of an acquisition for a convertible bond over a 2=-plane.
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Appendix C: Illustrations on the bankruptcy costs perspec-
tive
A. Unsecured straight bond
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(h) Excess leverage of an equity
maximizing capital structure
Figure 5: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and
the excess leverage of an agency maximizing capital structure of an acquisition for an unsecured
straight bond over a =2-plane.
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B. Senior secured bond
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(a) Debt value added
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(b) Equity value added
Figure 6: The value added/loss for the stakeholder of an acquisition for a senior secured bond
over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital coincide in this
case.
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C. Callable bond and CLO
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(a) Equity value added, callable bond that has been
renanced
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(b) Equity value added, CLO
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(c) Dierence in Equity value added between a CLO
and a renanced callable bond
Figure 7: The equity value added/loss of an acquisition for a callable bond that has been re-
nanced and a CLO over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital
coincide in this case.
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D. Convertible Bond
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Figure 8: The value added/loss, the agency gains/losses and the welfare loss of an acquisition
for a convertible bond over a =2-plane.
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Appendix D: Illustrations on the tax Perspective
A. Unsecured straight bond
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(c) Equity value added, value
maximizing capital structure
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(d) Equity value added, equity
maximizing capital structure
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(e) Debt agency costs
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(f) Equity agency gains
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(g) Welfare loss
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(h) Dierence in leverage ratio
before and after the acquisition,
value maximizing capital structure
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(i) Dierence in leverage ratio be-
fore and after the acquisition, eq-
uity maximizing capital structure
Figure 9: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and
the dierence in leverage of an acquisition for an unsecured straight bond over a =2-plane.
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B. Senior secured bond
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(a) Debt value added
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(b) Equity value added
Figure 10: The value added/loss for the stakeholder of an acquisition for a senior secured bond
over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital coincide in this case.
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C. Callable bond and CLO
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(a) Equity value added, callable bond that has been
renanced
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(b) Equity value added, CLO
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(c) Dierence in Equity value added between a CLO
and a renanced callable bond
Figure 11: The equity value added/loss of an acquisition for a callable bond that has been
renanced and a CLO over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing
capital coincide in this case.
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D. Convertible Bond
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(a) Debt value added, value max-
imizing capital structure
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(b) Debt value added, equity max-
imizing capital structure
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(c) Equity value added, value
maximizing capital structure
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(d) Equity value added, equity
maximizing capital structure
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(e) Debt agency costs
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(f) Equity agency gains
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(g) Welfare loss
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(h) Excess leverage of an equity
maximizing capital structure
Figure 12: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and
the excess leverage of an agency maximizing capital structure of an acquisition for an convertible
bond over a =2-plane.
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